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The novel as therapy: 
Ministrations of voice in an age of risk
Lecture on the Novel in English 
Read 15 May 2014
PATRICIA WAUGH
Abstract: Examining relations between ‘therapy culture’ and the ‘risk society’, this 
essay suggests that the novel developed to offer a powerful workout for the kinds of 
socio-cognitive capacities and gratifications required by the complex and ‘emergent’ 
cultures of modernity: recursive skills of mindreading and mental time-travelling, the 
negotiation of plural ontologies. Its development of a unique mode of ‘double voic-
ing’ allowed readers to situate the interior life in a complex and dynamic relation to 
the social. Reading novels challenges the default, making ‘safe’, capacities of the 
probabilistic or Bayesian brain. In its self-referentiality and invention of the idea of 
fictionality, the novel provides an education into awareness of the limits of models 
and their dangerous fetishisation. The novel therefore answers Wittgenstein’s search 
for a discourse that might provide a therapy for errors in thinking, embedded deep in 
structural and analogical functions of language and especially those perceptual 
 metaphors of vision that carry the epistemological beliefs that looking in is the route 
to self-transparency. 
Keywords: therapy, voice, the novel, ‘risk society’, recursive, mindreading, Bayesian 
brain, self-referentiality, fictionality, Witgenstein
Artists are clinicians, not with respect to their own case, nor even with respect to a 
case in general; rather, they are clinicians of civilisation . . . It seems . . . that an eval-
uation of symptoms might be achieved only through a novel.1 
Writing is controlled personality disorder [. . .]. It’s controlled because in order to 
make it work you have to concentrate on the voices in your head and get them talking 
to each other.2
1 Deleuze (1969), 237. 
2 Mitchell (2013), 200.
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From the outset in formal philosophy, thinking has been thought of in terms of seeing 
. . . if  one considers how easy it is for sight unlike the other senses to shut out the 
outside world and if  one examines the early notion of the blind bard, whose stories 
are being listened to, one may wonder why hearing did not develop into the guiding 
metaphor for thinking.3
THE SMALL PERSONAL VOICE AND THE COMPLEX TOTALITY: 
READING NOVELS
The novel as therapy rather than the novel and therapy or the novel of therapy. The 
title is intended as a challenge: to think through and then beyond some familiar 
assumptions about the nature of the novel and what might be understood by the term 
‘therapy’ and to use the aspectival force of ‘as’ to generate some less obvious ways of 
seeing. The key concepts of the analysis will be those of complexity, fictionality, voice 
and recursivity. In the end though, everything rests on the peculiar intimacy of  reading 
novels, their depiction of character as interiority; their capacity to absorb the reader 
through imaginary minds into a storyworld that takes on the feeling of the real even 
as it announces, in various ways, its fictionality. On the simplest definition of the 
novel, most would agree: novels are complex written narrative structures defined in 
contradistinction to other kinds of  narrative by the peculiar and singular nature of 
their fictionality. But they are ‘told’, that is to say, mediated, not by a flesh and 
blood oral storyteller, but through ontologically and metaphorically slippery textual 
effects of  voices. Novels are realised or ‘concretised’ in the imagination of  their 
readers as  storyworlds, in a controlled but often immersive experience that produces 
well- attested uncanny effects: the feeling that we know the places of  fiction—
Dickens’s London, Joyce’s Dublin, George Eliot’s Middlemarch—and their deni-
zens—Esther Greenwood, Leopold Bloom, Dorothea Brooke—as well as or even 
better than the way we know the places of  our own past or the personages of  our 
present. Because the ontological status of  the fictional world is determined by its 
verbal condition, novelistic worlds and their inhabitants are characteristically and 
tantalisingly ‘gappy’ or indeterminate. But so are minds. Reading novels, like the 
process of   therapy, is the discovery through transference that the self  is a dynamic 
process of  intersubjectivity. But novels also offer us control: in the private space of 
reading and writing, characters appear exhilaratingly fresh and uncolonised, available 
therefore for the personal extrapolation of the reader in conversation with a real and 
yet  imaginary author, a shadowy presence similarly reconstituted through the process 
of construal that is reading. 
3 Arendt (1978), 110–11.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, characters become companions, like childhood 
 ‘imaginary friends’ who, mysteriously, never age but still grow and change with their 
readers, transition effortlessly back and forth across temporal and ontological divides. 
And in our immersion in them, whether as readers or writers, we enter a condition of 
absorption, a kind of controlled dissociative state. Close to the delusional and yet 
rarely crossing the line, all novel readers and writers know the experience of being 
immersed in a world that feels life-like in its unfolding of open horizons, each new 
perspective—whether the focalisation of a character or a new analogical trope that 
condenses a complex node of the experiential—seeming to add ‘depth’ to the whole. 
Yet all of this is experienced in the knowledge that nothing is risked, for we are safely 
held in the telos of the invented, offered space for the constant switching of outer and 
inner attention from the magical place opened up by the words, to the words them-
selves, and to the inner space of reflection, memory and planning, where we review 
our own wider experience. In reading fiction, through the entanglement with recogni-
tions, identifications, challenges to our confirmation biases, we arrive at ourselves 
expanded through an encounter with the new and strange. We are made to review and 
therefore become more acquainted with our own expectations and wider assumptions, 
our own interpretative stance. And though this process, like any good therapy, can 
disturb, we are held in the singular mode of the fictional future anterior, looking 
 forward in order to look back, experiencing that consolation of formal closure that 
offers retrospective meaning, and yet the feeling of existential openness as we move 
forward through the book: this is the import of Frank Kermode’s memorably phrased 
‘sense of an ending’.4 Novels allow us to order our minds more completely by taking 
us closer to the edge of disorder. 
The theme to be explored in the first half  of this essay is that a powerful but 
 overlooked aspect of the therapeutic effect of reading fiction lies in its transferential 
capacity to produce in us the effect, as in the ‘talking cure’, of a voice that mingles 
with our own inner speech, as if  it listens to and throws back a more comprehensive 
and clarified version of what we take ourselves to be. In fiction, however, the trans-
action occurs internally, through the sounds as well as the pictures that we hear in our 
heads, so that attentive reading is a kind of mimicry of composition—as suggested in 
David Mitchell’s observation (quoted above) that writing novels is concentrating on 
the voices in your head and getting them to talk to each other. If  composure, for 
writer and reader, is the outcome of composition, its achievement will almost  certainly 
occur through  disturbance or discomposure of our customary inner dialogue with 
ourselves. This is a process uniquely associated with the singularity of voice in the 
novel. Whereas the seeing self  is separate from the perceived world, analysing its 
4 Kermode (1967).
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 surroundings through the distancing eye, the listening self  is immersed in that world 
through the sounds that reverberate through the ear and enter the body. Stephen 
Connor suggests that since we can hear many sounds at the same time, and cannot 
simply turn our ears away from a sound as we can our eyes from a sight, the ‘self  
defined in terms of hearing rather than sight is a self  imagined not as a point, but as 
a membrane; not as a picture, but as a channel through which voices, noises and 
musics travel’.5 I will suggest that sound and voice are major agents for our feeling of 
immersion in fictional worlds, as important as ‘pictures’, but almost always over-
looked in our tendency to think of consciousness as an ‘inner theatre’. Read atten-
tively, most novels disturb the tendency to imagine an inner self  that is unified and 
fixed, a shadowy homunculus, crouched in the dark, awaiting the searchlight of an 
inner eye that might illuminate and clarify its contours.6 
In fiction, voice is a textual effect, often non-locatable in an embodied source. 
Often we are unaware who is speaking, for even the impersonal expressivity of style 
produces the feeling that behind the most objective description of a scene or land-
scape, or the apparently direct as well as indirect reporting of thought or talk, a 
ghostly enunciator hovers. This ‘voice’, like our own inner speech, might be heard only 
if  we listen attentively: to tone, timbre, nuance, syntax, repetition. Mostly our atten-
tion is directed towards the world; mostly we barely notice our inner speech. In fiction, 
though, attention is drawn to voice as the necessary and complex medium of the story. 
Though novels often welcome us in pictorially, taking the inner eye over a threshold 
or along a path, often it is sound or voice that takes us in deeper to an imaginary 
world. At the opening of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury [1929], for example, we 
follow the uncomprehending Benjy Compson’s gaze ‘along the fence’, but what has 
brought Benjy to the perimeter of the golf  course is sound, the repeated cry of ‘caddy’ 
that echoes in Benjy’s head, a name that makes emotionally present his long departed 
and disowned sister who, until her disgrace, had loved him with a kind of maternal 
fervour so lacking in the cold and self-absorbed Mrs Compson.7 Similarly, in the 
opening of Mrs Dalloway [1925] Clarissa’s transportation into the past of girlhood is 
effected through a train of thought, conveyed through free indirect discourse, where 
the word ‘hinge’—Rumpelmayer’s men are coming to take the doors off  their hinges—
brings an imaginary sound into Clarissa’s mind, a ‘squeak of the hinges, which she 
could hear now’, as the doors are opened and she ‘plunges’ into her young womanhood 
and the romantic complications at Bourton.8
5 Connor (1997), 207.
6 See Sartre’s (1940) interesting discussion of the imagination’s ‘picturing’ power and Scarry’s (2001) use 
of the neuroscience of visual imagining which develops this argument.
7 Faulkner (1990), 3.
8 Woolf (1998), 3.
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If the voices of novels seem to speak to us intimately, the novel genre has long 
sought its defence in the humble terms of usefulness, entertainment or education, 
rather than in an elevated aesthetic of detached contemplation. Hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the novel has recently found itself  appropriated for therapy. Prose is not 
Prozac. But one might be forgiven for thinking otherwise, given the boom in reading 
groups, six-figure-viewing TV shows such as the Oprah Book Club in the US, the 
Richard and Judy Book Club in the UK, or the considerable success and cultural 
impact of the Reader Organisation, launched in the UK in 1997, to promote shared 
reading as a therapeutic practice.9 Yet the novel’s widespread success was from the first 
almost entirely bound to the market and commercial fortune, subjecting it therefore 
to pressure to be morally edifying, sentimentally educational, socially connective: use-
ful. If  Scheherazade told stories to save her life, the first fictional character to be cre-
ated without a prior model, Robinson Crusoe, is the ultimate icon of the survivor, 
talking to and writing himself  into sanity and in so doing, creating, like his maker, a 
meaningful world, in a kind of mise-en-abyme effect that already echoes the multiple 
embedding of the oral tale in The Thousand and One Nights. 
Crusoe is saved from the traumatic effects of his shipwreck and castaway condi-
tion by his ability to listen to his own thoughts, allow his inner voices to speak to each 
other, and in the comfort he takes in their externalisation as he talks to God and 
writes in his journal. He insists that his life, twenty-seven years in solitude, was ‘better 
than sociable, for when I began to regret the want of Conversation, I would ask myself  
whether . . . conversing with my own Thoughts, and, as I hope I may say, with even 
God himself  . . . was not better than the utmost Enjoyment of humane society in the 
World’.10 Aside from the discovery of the footprint, his moment of greatest discompo-
sure is when he is awakened from sleep by the voice of the parrot that has listened to 
his cries of despair and now mimics back his master’s voice, calling his name, ‘poor 
Robinson Crusoe’.11 Crusoe responds with terror; it is as if  the inner voice of despair 
has broken free, to exert its independent agency as tormentor in the world outside his 
head. Joyce’s Bloom, some two hundred years later, walking through the Dublin cem-
etery to the funeral of Paddy Dignam and reflecting how ‘every Friday buries a 
Thursday’, finds the voice of the parrot now parodied in a ditty running through his 
head too: ‘O, Poor Robinson Crusoe, How could you possibly do so’ while his shade 
mysteriously reappears in the hallucinatory visions of Circe’s brothel fantasy.12 In 
 9 University of Liverpool (2014), a summary of the ethos of ‘shared reading’ and an explanation of the 
therapeutic benefits of shared reading aloud: liveness, creative inarticulacy and emergence, emotion, 
attention and personal and group relations. The report also contains a useful history of the project. 
10 Defoe (1975), 107.
11 Ibid., 112.
12 Joyce (1960), 138.
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Defoe’s novel, however, Crusoe mostly invokes the voice of the other within to control 
despair, addressing himself  in the second person so as to challenge the loud expostu-
lations of hopelessness with quiet admonishment, personified as the inner voice of 
reason: ‘Reason, as it were, expostulated with me t’other Way thus: Well, you are in a 
desolate Condition ’tis true, but pray remember, Where are the rest of you . . .Why 
were you singled out. Is it better to be here or there, and then I pointed to the sea?13 
Does Crusoe actually or mentally point to the sea as he thinks about his drowned 
companions? Even in this earliest of novels, voice blurs the boundary between inner 
and outer, internalisation and externalisation: the pluralisation of inner voice allows 
Crusoe to listen to another voice that counters his downward spiral of thought; else-
where voices allow him to externalise emotions he is unaware of so that he reflects, ‘I 
had a great deal of comfort within’; finally, he fully externalises his inner thoughts as 
a formalised dialogue in the double-entry book method of his journal, with its  columns 
of ‘Debtor and Creditor’ that transform the religious discourses of sin into those of 
the new commercial world of credit.14 In creating the journal, therefore, Crusoe finds 
the means to resolve in himself, through the unique economy of writing, the conflict-
ing voices conveying a world of miracle and revelation and the more austere rational-
ity of Baconian method. The composition of the journal makes permanent the 
precariously achieved inner composure that is arrived at through ‘listening in’. In the 
early 18th century Crusoe has successfully discovered the benefits of ‘narrative 
therapy’.15 
As the theory era gives way to the therapy culture and the preoccupation with 
narrative, affect and the body in academic criticism, the incorporation of the confes-
sional novel into the more capacious category of ‘life writing’ has a well-established 
precedent therefore in the history of fiction. Scheherazade told stories to save her life 
but Robinson Crusoe, initially presented by Defoe as a true narrative, writes his way 
to survival. For the term ‘life-writing’ was coined by the Modernist scholar Shari 
Benstock16 to articulate the idea that if  selves are processes generated through and 
entwined with endlessly looping and constitutive acts of naming, narration,  assembling 
of voices, then selves, like novels, are not merely ‘narrative’—as in Bruner’s idea of 
self-narration as the defining act of the human subject—they are also, in some sense, 
fictional, made up. Not only are characters imaginary people, but people are  imaginary 
13 Defoe, 78.
14 Ibid., 51.
15 Narrative therapy is the term given to a psychotherapeutic method developed by White & Epston 
(1990). Narrative therapy works with the broadly social constructionist idea that we constitute our 
identities through the available stories and narratives in our culture, and that individual problems can be 
reworked by externalising them through a retelling in conversation with a therapist that aims to 
reconfigure the main storylines. 
16 See Benstock (2001). 
 The Novel as Therapy 41
characters.17 Under the umbrella of ‘life-writing’, memoirs, confessions, autobiogra-
phies and biographies have been gathered in alongside the crop of  newer genres, the 
misery memoir, illness diary, autobiografiction, trauma testimony, the docu-novel 
and the new journalism, so that earlier distinctions between the factual veracity or 
apparent ‘truth’ of  the memoir, and the evident fictionality or pseudo-referentiality 
of  the novel—even without post-structuralist finessing—have grown blurred. But the 
so-called ‘narrative turn’ that has made writing synonymous with life and turned the 
talking cure into a writing one, has brought a further significant return. 
After seventy years of New Critical textualism, modernist impersonality, affective 
and intentional fallacies, structuralist and post-structuralist banishment, critical 
interest has returned to the relationship between authors and the voices of their texts, 
and to readers and what they do with texts and the voices in them. Both might be 
regarded as quests for meaningfulness or imaginary conversation. The ‘hermeneutics 
of suspicion’ is lightening its scepticism. The ‘narrative turn’ has opened a pathway to 
the therapeutic. Even academic critics now acknowledge novels as a species of ‘life 
writing’ or writing that arises out of and feeds into the experiential; they have begun 
to feel that it might no longer be a betrayal of their professional dignity to write about 
how novels move real readers and shape their lives or to recognise the fact that authors 
are not just accidental precipitations out of intertextual collisions, but real beings who 
have toiled and left their imprints in the worlds made by words. The upshot is some 
loosening of the categorical distinction between the professional critic and the 
 common reader: between reading novels for pleasure and intimate engagement and 
reading them as socio-political or philosophical critique, well-wrought urns. People 
read to be transported, to feel wonder, to understand themselves; the therapeutic turn 
has brought the engagement previously associated with the ‘common reader’ to the 
interpretative community of the academy, with its more formalist and historicist 
 concerns.18 But with this affective and narrative turn come new worries: that we are 
all, literary intelligentsia and common reader alike, grown fuzzy and sentimental or—
dare one say it—middlebrow—under the soft penumbra of the therapeutic. Academic 
criticism, however, always fears an inward or ‘subjective’ turn, away from social 
 critique and ideological awareness to complicity with a confession-obsessed culture. 
So key issues are raised: are there ways of opening up the concept of therapy itself  
that might generate new means of framing and describing the nature and organisation 
of novels and facilitate new insights into their uses? If  novels are therapeutic, how do 
they protect themselves or how might they be protected against reductionist practices 
17 Bruner (1990).
18 On reading and being transported, see Gerrig (1998) and Ryan ( 2001), and for a defence of what 
Virginia Woolf originally called the ‘common reader’ and of reading for wonder, recognition and 
pleasure, see Felski (2008). 
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of  therapeutic appropriation or charges of inwardness, introversion or narcissism? 
How does the novel itself  expand the possible modes and meanings of the 
therapeutic? 
THE NOVEL, THE RISK SOCIETY AND THE 
RISE OF THE ‘THERAPY CULTURE’
What is a risk society? And what does it have to do with therapy and the novel as 
therapy? In World at Risk (2009), Ulrich Beck points out that the threat of illness, 
premature death, famine, plague and natural disaster was greater in the Middle Ages 
than in the 21st century. What has changed, however, is the semantics of risk. By the 
17th century, ‘risk represents the perceptual and cognitive schema in accordance with 
which a society mobilises itself  when it is confronted with the openness, uncertainties 
and obstructions of a self-created future and is no longer defined by religion, tradition 
or the superior power of nature’.19 The novel is born into this first modern risk society 
and is its literary expression. The novel was the first literary genre to create purely 
invented and singular ‘characters’ placed in complex and emergent storyworlds. The 
increasingly globalised world of the late 17th and early 18th century brought the first 
age of risk, credit and venture capitalism. For three hundred years, novels have 
 examined how catastrophe and irreversible change arise mostly unpredictably out of 
the small and everyday turbulences of networks of human beings going about their 
daily business. Talk and thought, the modelling and negotiation of risk and probabil-
ity, of threats and opportunities and of surprise and unintended consequences, is the 
very stuff  of fiction. 
The novel arose in an age of systems, situated both within and against system 
philosophies.20 It was contemporaneous too with the rise of the probability calculus, 
an age self-fashioning and reflexive, preoccupied with cultural capital and taste, the 
new economic precariousness of booms and busts. Requiring attention to social as 
well as economic performance, the negotiation of masks and a greater need for pre-
diction of the behaviours of others, the age shared with the novel an awareness of the 
important role of affect in practical reason. For Lukacs, though never a cognitive map 
of a totality, the novel facilitated the modelling of the real beyond the lifeless statistics 
of the social sciences and the logico-empirical separation of facts and values.21 Its 
grasp of the complex and dynamic or dialectical nature of experience is reiterated and 
19 Beck (2009), 4.
20 ‘I am not writing a system, but a history’ insists the narrator of Tom Jones (see Fielding ([1749] 2005), 
568). For a discussion of the rise of the novel and 18th-century ‘system’ theorising see Siskin (2001).
21 Lukacs (1971).
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performed through the reading experience as it is mediated by the singularity of 
 fictional voice. Novels might be seen as simulated models of worlds that are created 
through their own modelling activity, self-conscious testimonies to the power and the 
limitation of models in general and of their fetishistic tendencies: that we may be 
tempted to use them as vehicles for over-extrapolation when confronted with the new 
and unknown, taking selections as wholes and therefore blinding ourselves to the 
uncertainty principle always introduced by the model.22 Reading novels, therefore, 
might be thought of as a way of developing mental skills to meet the demands of this 
new risk society. Part of this involved the calculation of and judgement on  probabilities, 
but also a recognition of  the need to temper the purely logico-empirical account of 
knowing with a new awareness of  the centrality of  affect and embodiedness in 
 negotiating a complex world. The novel has always been associated with the cultiva-
tion and strengthening of  the ‘moral sentiments’ into what Michael Bell has described 
as a metaphysical principle, a bulwark against the Hobbesian account of  competing 
interests in the war of  all against all of  the new market homo economicus.23 Novels 
provide training too in practical reasoning skills; in thinking beyond linear models of 
causality that reduce human and social processes to mechanical systems or discrete 
causes. That the real world is complex, messy and interconnected, self-interpreting 
and indeterminate; that it is always more than the sum of its parts, renders any single 
or linear model of causality grossly inadequate as the vehicle for explaining its 
 emergent behaviours.24 Reading novels exercises the ability to grasp circular causali-
ties, the way the world is experienced forwards and understood backwards, the way 
our confirmation biases trip us even as we think we are being most attentive, and the 
way our values and affective lives enter into what we deem to be our most impassive 
and objective judgements. 
Even at the level of negotiating a storyline, novels offer a ‘workout’ for both linear 
and more complex kinds of thinking, requiring the exercise of hypothesis revision, 
inference, abduction, close observation, pattern recognition and the ‘looping’ effect of 
language and values.25 To follow a fictional plot hones recursive skills for mental ‘time 
travel’—projecting into the past and the future whilst relating the projection to a 
22 See Derman (2011).
23 Bell (2000).
24 Complexity theory grew out of work developed at the Santa Fe Institute on complex adaptive systems 
and drew on earlier systems theorists such as Niklas Luhmann and the cybernetic theories of the 1940s 
and 1950s associated with Von Neuman and Shannon and Weaver. The work of Stuart Kauffman, in 
particular, is key for the development of complex dynamic systems theory; see Kauffman (1993); for 
useful discussions, see Morin (2008); Vester (2007). 
25 Hacking (2006) coined the term ‘looping kinds’ to describe the way in which labelling and naming an 
entity can change and determine its behaviour or responses to it of others; he summarises his use of the 
term succinctly in a short piece.
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 moving point in the present—in its dynamic and complex processes of prolepsis and 
analepsis. In reading novels, we are constantly required to realign the time of the story 
and that of the discourse in cognitive manoeuvres that involve numerous temporal 
embeddings. Similarly, recursivity as perspective taking, the necessity for and ability 
to model other minds, anticipate behaviours, reflect on motives is the essence of 
 characterological intersubjectivity. Cognitive theorists such as Lisa Zunshine, Alan 
Palmer, David Herman and others have demonstrated how, by the 19th century, 
 novelists such as Jane Austen had pioneered techniques for modelling six or seven 
embedded layers of meta-representation of other minds: that A thinks that B thinks 
that C thinks that A thinks that B thinks and on, demonstrating the capacity of the 
mind to track and monitor its intersubjective relations in minutely complex ways, but 
revealing also the vast possibilities for error, self-deception, self-delusion and 
 subterfuge in the process.26
Indeed, invoking Don Quixote as the first modern novel, Beck notes that even 
the term ‘quixotic’ has come to mean the failure to apply to the modern world the 
mental calculations of  probability that are required in its safe and successful nego-
tiation. Don Quixote, trapped in inappropriate and rigid mental schema, is unable 
to respond to the new challenges of  his time, the rise of  a more complex and fluid 
and commercial world.27 His problem is that he mistakes model for real and though 
Don Quixote sets up the possibility of  the novel as a genre, Cervantes’ work is really 
an investigation of  the limitations of  the heroic and chivalric codes for negotiating 
the modern world. Beck argues that ‘in the first modern novels this heroism of  risk 
is narrated as an awakening into an unknown world involving ever more unpredict-
ability’.28 But he suggests further that we now inhabit an age of  global risk, an eco-
logical network, whose cascading effects and recursive feedback effects outstrip in 
complexity the reach of  even the most rigorous probabilistic calculation. Our terms 
of  engagement change the nature of  that process; even science now generates more 
uncertainties in its iatrogenic effects and unintended consequences than it produces 
effective models through which to grasp the dynamic systems of  the new globalised 
era. Uncertainty, no longer overcome by knowledge, is more often its effect, in 
everything from the economy and consumer habits, to the spread of  ideas and inno-
vations, diseases and trends, climate and security systems. A world has opened up, 
according to Beck,  without clear distinctions between knowing and unknowing; 
26 See Herman (2013), Palmer (2008), Zunshine (2006) and Zunshine (2012).
27 Though one might also argue that Cervantes (2005) is intentionally equivocal too in his treatment of 
his protagonist’s madness, suggesting that though his nostalgia for and romantic idealisation of the code 
of chivalry leads him into delusional behaviours, and makes him mad, it also keeps alive a set of higher 
values that might otherwise die.
28 Ibid., 5.
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risk now ‘amalgamates knowing with non-knowing within the semantic horizon of 
probability’.29 
Beck regards the novel as the genre which arose contemporaneously with the risk 
 society. But he also connects the risk society to the rise of therapy culture. His key 
argument is that, since 1945, an increasingly globalised risk culture generates, fans 
and manipulates fears of mostly invisible and indefinable threats and with this a 
 feeling of vulnerability, of being ‘at risk’, as a strategy for legitimising political and 
social control. The therapeutic becomes the vehicle for a political process which, since 
the Cold War, has sought to intensify belief  in the separation of the public and the 
private in order that the escalating dysfunction that is the fallout of global risk society 
is experienced and represented as privatised and interior. Suitably privatised, malaise 
is then medicalised as part of the management of affective life. Frank Furedi takes 
Beck’s argument as the starting point for his book, Therapy Culture: Cultivating 
Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age (2004), where he argues that the risk society is the 
major agent in the rise of ‘therapy culture’. Furedi’s concept of a ‘therapy culture’ 
draws on Philip Rieff’s earlier account of the ‘triumph’ of the therapeutic.30 Rieff ’s 
analysis, of the therapeutic as the epistemological and ethical centre of instrumental 
rationality, grew out of and influenced the work of Herbert Marcuse, Christopher 
Lasch and Thomas Szasz in the 1960s; since 1980, it has been taken up by commenta-
tors as politically various as Alistair MacIntyre, Richard Sennett and Fredric Jameson. 
All, however, share a view of the ‘therapeutic’ as the velvet glove of an increasingly 
managed and bureaucratic society. This is the key theme that sustains Alistair 
MacIntyre’s seminal study of moral theory, After Virtue, published in 1981.31 Furedi 
focuses therefore on the medicalised management of everyday life and, in particular, 
on the generation of ever more diagnostic categories to explain the human experience 
of distress or malaise. Indeed, the year before the publication of MacIntyre’s book, 
the American Association of Psychiatry published the third edition of its diagnostic 
handbook (DSM, III, 1980) which included a new syndrome, Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, or PTSD, soon to become a buzzword of the post-1980s generation, along 
with its constituent terms, ‘trauma’ and ‘stress’. The term ‘stressed out’ entered 
 colloquial language in 1983 at the heart of what would be termed the ‘postmodern 
29 Ibid.
30 Rieff  (1966). 
31 MacIntyre (1981), 30, argues that ‘the manager represents in his character the obliteration of the 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations; the therapist represents the 
same obliteration in the sphere of personal life. The manager treats ends as given, as outside his scope, 
his concern is with technique, with effectiveness in transforming raw materials into final products . . . The 
therapist also treats ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is with technique, with effectiveness 
in transforming neurotic symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted 
ones.’
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condition’, with its avowed sense of the ‘unmappability’ and disorienting complexity 
of an increasingly globalised and uncertain world. The deregulation of financial 
 services and the caricature of the burnt-out city executive were key themes in the 
 fiction of the decade: in the work of Don DeLillo, Brett Easton Ellis and Martin 
Amis.32 The novel, the risk culture and the therapeutic, seem to have grown up together, 
evolving hand in hand. When one considers that the fifth edition of the DSM now lists 
500 syndromes, then it is hardly surprising, as is evident glancing over the Pocket 
Guide to Therapy (2012) with its praise for the greater ‘diversity of therapy’ and the 
professionalisation of its models, that there are now dozens of therapies from which 
to choose: from cognitive behaviour therapy, cognitive analytic therapy, psycho-
dynamic therapy, systemic therapies, narrative therapy, person-centred therapy, couples 
therapy, family therapy, mindfulness, solution-focused brief  therapy, dialectical 
behaviour therapy—and many, many, more.33
In this context, Furedi’s argument that the age of the ‘talking cure’ has also been 
the age of a professionalised therapeutic cultivation of  vulnerability, rather than the 
provision of a means for its overcoming, has some force. Furedi describes a situation 
where a now all-pervasive therapy culture perpetuates and disseminates itself  by 
inventing ever more syndromes in a general pathologisation of experience that trans-
lates most of the challenges of living in an uncertain world into the vocabularies of 
psychological medicine: ‘distress is not something to be lived but a void that needs 
treatment’.34 Like Beck, too, he reverses the normally assumed relations of cause and 
effect, viewing the concept of ‘vulnerability’ at the heart of the therapeutic as an 
invention scaffolded by the promulgation and dissemination of the concept of ‘risk 
society’. Instead of taking risks, understood as using our resourcefulness to meet the 
challenges that life throws up, we see ourselves increasingly at risk, vulnerable, in need 
of professional intervention. Everyone complains endlessly of being ‘stressed’ and 
every difficult or challenging experience is read as ‘traumatic’. As the world grows 
more complex and unpredictable and as the risk discourse reinforces a sense of things 
spinning ever beyond our control, individuals are recast as powerless victims-in-the-
making: ‘today’s tendency to interpret events through the prism of trauma serves to 
cultivate a profound sense of fatalism in the public imagination’.35 And as the world 
becomes ever more complex and beyond the predictions of probabilistic reasoning, 
the individual is encouraged to see his or her problems as internal and fixed: the 
32 See Jackson (2013) for a discussion of the rise and circulation of the term ‘stress’. The idea of the 
contemporary world as ‘unmappable’ was first put forward in Jameson’s seminal essay (1984), 
‘Postmodernism and the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism’, see Jameson (1991), 51.
33 See introduction to Weatherhead & Flaherty-Jones (2011). 
34 Furedi (2004), 114.
35 Ibid., 127.
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 consequence of irrational thinking or uncontrolled affect. The recourse to profession-
alised and ‘expert’ intervention is more and more sought. For Furedi, the possibility 
of cultivating resilience, self-composure and an activist stance through shared and 
meaningful exchange within a community, therefore slips out of view, an abandoned 
fantasy of the ‘organic community’. 
Novelists themselves have expressed concern about their often unwilling recruit-
ment to this new therapy culture. Caryl Philips, for example, worries that writers are 
in danger of becoming the new face of ‘care in the community’, a fear brilliantly and 
surreally played out in Kazuo Ishiguro’s provocative and inventive novel of 1995, The 
Unconsoled, with its examination of the fortunes of the contemporary artist, expected 
to be part of a cosmopolitan world of ‘caring professionals’, to be an international 
ethicist who must exercise a kind of impossible telescopic philanthropy as he is 
 compelled to respond to local demands in a globalised world.36 Commercial forces 
control his schedule and global demands consume his rehearsal and performance 
time; he has become a stranger to his family and loved ones, but mostly to himself. But 
Ishiguro, like many writers before him, has also averred the therapeutic value of writ-
ing fiction as consolation for the wound incurred in the passage from a naive narcis-
sism to a more mature reality principle, the recognition that ‘the world isn’t quite the 
way you wanted it but you can somehow reorder it or try to come to terms with it by 
actually creating your own world’.37 In David Lodge’s comically Kierkegaardian 
novel, Therapy (1995), his mid-life crisis protagonist, Tubby Passmore, tries out a 
smorgasbord of therapeutic consultations and cures and various erotic distractions 
until he recovers his soul, if  not the ‘internal derangement of his knee’, through the 
decision to keep a journal. Like his author, and like the first fictional character of the 
novel in English, Tubby, we assume, has saved himself  through writing.38
Of recent conversions to the therapeutic, Jonathan Franzen’s has received most 
publicity. In an infamous essay published in Harper’s Magazine in 1996, entitled ‘Why 
Bother?’, he insisted that he couldn’t ‘stomach any kind of notion that serious fiction 
is good for us’, explaining that, ‘it’s hard to consider literature as medicine, in any case, 
when reading it serves mainly to deepen your depressing estrangement from the main-
stream; sooner or later the therapeutically minded reader will end up fingering reading 
itself  as the sickness’.39 But Franzen is now one of the converted, advocating the novel 
as a kind of panacea for a society of the ‘lonely crowd’, defending fiction as one of the 
few freely available antidotes to the kind of existential loneliness that is at the heart of 
so much contemporary distress and suffering. Reading fiction offers the promise of a 
36 Ward (2012), 644; Ishiguro (1995). 
37 Ishiguro, Vorda & Herzinger (1993), 31.
38 Lodge (1995), 13.
39 Franzen (2002), 73.
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communion of  minds; he now insists that he writes, ‘to find an adequate vehicle for 
the most difficult stuff  at the core of  me, in the hope that that might resonate in the 
reader who otherwise has been feeling alone with those feelings’.40 Franzen uses the 
vocabularies of  contemporary therapy but his defence of  the novel is as old as the 
genre. From the early 18th century, the legitimacy of  the new genre rested on its 
capacity to defend itself  from charges that in immersing its readers in imaginary 
though credible worlds, the novel might ‘disorder’ minds and contribute to  delusional 
states.41 This fear continued until novelists became comfortable with the ontology of 
fictionality, no  longer feeling the need intentionally to blur the boundary between the 
imaginary and the real, to dress up their stories as ‘life’ writing in the form of pur-
portedly ‘true’  memoirs, confessions, journals. Unease about the deceptivenss of the 
new form, its probabilism and credibility, lay in fears that the novel was being designed 
intentionally to bamboozle readers into taking the imaginary for the real. The 
counter-argument to this rested on seeing novels as a moral force, able to organise and 
refine the moral  sentiments and contribute to the development of the capacity for 
 fellow feeling or empathy. 
Franzen, of course, uses fictionality in his own novels as an ironic tool with which 
to challenge easy complacency in the sphere of the empathetic, the lurking narcissism 
that can lie in an over-ready caritas with its potentially self-gratifying display of altru-
ism. But this kind of affective irony is not a singular native of postmodernism, for it 
was actually an invention of the 18th century. Here we return to the importance of 
voice in any evaluation of the relation of the novel to the therapeutic. In Sterne’s A 
Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy [1768], its author plays with the ambi-
guities of language, so that the vehicle that transports its sentimental traveller is also 
that of the book we are holding in our hands. Of the various staged moments of sen-
timent, the most ironic is the scene where Yorick sees the bird in the cage, languishing 
in its confinement, so he wills himself  to stand before it and imagine that it represents 
‘the millions of my fellow creatures born to no inheritance but slavery’. But having 
indulged the moment of fellow feeling, Yorick runs off, overwhelmed, leaving the 
poor bird to be sold into a further and more abject condition of slavery. Sterne is evi-
dently deploying irony to reveal the limits of the sentimental and its precarious close-
ness to the self-regarding emotionalism of narcissism. If  we examine the passage more 
closely, however, what is evident is the emphasis on the way that narcissistic sentimen-
tality is linked specifically and quite emphatically to visual perception, to the act of 
looking and seeing; we are told how ‘affecting’ Yorick finds ‘the picture’ of the bird, 
how he looks closer through the cage door ‘to take his picture and how he there ‘beheld 
40 Franzen (2010), interview with Helena de Bertodano.
41 For a thorough discussion of early concerns about the fictionality of fiction, see Paige (2011).
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his body’. It is only when in imagination, in his inner ear, that he ‘heard his chains 
upon his legs’ that he was then able to see ‘the iron enter his soul—I burst into tears—I 
could not sustain the picture of confinement which my fancy had drawn’.42 
Though the sentimental novel is usually viewed as ironising the excessive senti-
mentalism of benevolent philosophy, the most influential treatise on empathy, Adam 
Smith’s account of  the moral sentiments, shares with Defoe, Sterne and other novel-
ists such as Richardson the emphasis on inner hearing rather than outward seeing as 
the source of  the truly empathetic; for it is in the inner speech of  thought that the 
meaning of  suffering might be processed, as in the operation of  the still small voice 
of  conscience as opposed to the immediate sensorimotor ‘vibration’ triggered by the 
visual spectacle. Attunement to the inner voice as a kind of  internalised hearing of 
and sustained reflection on the voice of  the other is foregrounded. Listening in is 
here the basis for understanding the mind of  the other rather than any sympathetic 
vibration or mirroring in the nervous system. That glimpse of  real suffering,  however, 
is too much for this particular sentimental tourist to bear. 
But the mediation of the novel through the unique development of ‘voice’ enables 
an alternative therapeutic value to Furedi’s long arm of the managerial and the instru-
mental that he sees as professionalised therapy. In reading a novel, it is the small per-
sonal voice that connects the individual self  to the generation of a complex world with 
its multiple points of entry, focalisations, perspectives and meta-representations (the 
modelling of one mind inside another). The association with ‘therapy’ in the original 
sense of therapia—understood as to ‘minister to’ or provide remedy for—is implicit in 
the common analogy of both reading and writing novels with the fundamental  modern 
therapeutic situation of the ‘talking cure’. Like that of the therapist, the ‘voice’ of the 
novelist heard through the voices of characters produces an uncanny sense of felt 
presence when it enters, disturbingly or consolingly, into the internal conversation 
that all of us have with ourselves, as we reframe and filter our experience. To read a 
novel is a formalisation of this fundamental way of processing our lives that requires 
our full and sensitive attention but neither therapist nor, indeed, critic. The view taken 
here is that the novel might be said to amplify and strengthen the self ’s capacity for 
negotiating and living in, as well as examining, the terms of what Beck has called the 
‘risk society’. 
My argument is that the key vehicle for this process is the unique use and effect of 
voice in the writing and reading of novels. As Miguel de Unamuno noted in 1913, ‘to 
think is to talk with oneself, and each of us talks to himself  because we have had to 
talk to one another . . . Thought is interior language and internal language  originates 
42 Sterne (2008), 61.
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in external language’.43 In novels, we talk to ourselves mediated through the voices of 
the other but continuously jolted back into an awareness of our own inner voices as 
we negotiate textual hermeneutics through the prism of our own personal memories 
and readerly experience. As Denise Riley suggests, ‘If  I swing my attention onto my 
inner speech, I’m aware of it sounding in a very thin version of my own voice’.44 In 
reading we hear more insistently and become aware of thought as a play of voice, but 
we also experience a kind of auditory decentring and realignment as the ‘voice’ of 
others enters our own; we become aware too of how what is ‘me’ is always already 
constituted out of the voices of the other and that the monitoring of what is me is 
thus a complex and fragile process, a kind of constant performance of auto- 
ventriloquism, always threatening to break down with the arrival of new or previously 
unheard voices. But that is how inner speech functions as thinking  outside fiction, 
though we mostly forget that the ‘voices’ we hear as our own in the flow of inner dia-
logue with ourselves are those decompressed internalisations of the  dialogue we take 
in from birth, from the world outside.45 That is why novels remind us continuously, as 
Bakhtin argues, that language is ‘not an abstract system of normative forms but rather 
a concrete heteroglot conception of the world’.46 Voice in fiction is a revelation that 
the self  outside fiction is not simply a self-interpreting narrative but, even before this 
process of reflection and ordering, already and fundamentally a heteroglot of voices. 
If  we pay attention to the complexity of voice in fiction, we realise that, in being most 
psychologically attuned to interiority, the novel is also most attuned, at the same time, 
to social context. 
Recent research on reading fiction suggests that internal attention is directed 
through voice: we tend to hear our own inner voice when the language of the text is 
complex or challenging and demands attention or resonates with other motifs and 
passages as in the construction of a sense of spatial form.47 In dialogue, we hear the 
imagined voices of characters or an absence of auditory voicing as in more discursive 
or information giving passages of writing. Reading is again a kind of formalisation of 
43 Quoted in Toulmin (1979), 7.
44 Riley (2004), 58.
45 Vygotsky (1934) challenged Piaget’s idea of the evolution of speech as developing from egocentric to 
externally oriented talk. Instead, he put forward the view, based on his own experiments, that contrary to 
Piaget’s view, inner speech was an internalisation of voiced egocentric speech, acquired socially and 
internalised and condensed as silent verbal thought, suggesting that thinking as inner speech is an 
important factor in constructing a self  out of the conversations and verbal relations conducted in the 
social world. The external world is thus always already a constituent of the internal verbal world of 
thought. On Vygotsky’s theory of inner speech and its relevance to understanding the phenomenon of 
auditory verbal hallucinations, see Fernyhough & McCarthy Jones (2010), 87–105.
46 Bakhtin (1981), 219.
47 Kuzmicova (2013).
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thinking: the internalisation of dialogue that produces our inner speech, much of it 
condensed into the form of a kind of silent telegraphese sometimes referred to as 
‘mentalese’, is re-elaborated as we consciously turn our attention to difficult tasks, or 
to reflection on our ongoing flow of perceptual experience. Here we hear our own 
inner voice as an internal dialogue or inner speech. So in reading, as we struggle for 
meaning through the opacity of the medium—its resistance to ready-made absorption 
and its obtruding of itself, the inner voice identified as our own, struggling to create 
meaningfulness, plays in and out, hearing itself  in meta-interpretative activity, hear-
ing the other in dialogue and interior monologue and the sounds of the imaginary 
world, as the medium seems to become transparent. Understood in such terms, we 
can see that the capacity of the novel to present ‘interiority’ is also its capacity to pres-
ent the way in which the voices of the world shape and determine what we hear inside 
our heads. So the therapeutic qualities of the novel are not dependent on a narcissis-
tically focused introspection or an ‘inward turn’ that takes no account of the pressures 
and contexts of the world. As Stephen Toulmin has argued, this is to confuse interior-
ity with inwardness: ‘our mental life goes on in the interior; it just happens to be the 
business of neural networks in the cortex rather than of some metaphysical soul’ but, 
he continues, ‘our lives become inward because we make them so’.48 In Beckett’s 
 novels, for example, the turn inwards is a consequence of a world that no longer offers 
scaffolding for a self; the internal dialogue has so far replaced all sense of anything 
outside that the voice speaking or the self  writing no longer knows whether it speaks 
or is spoken, writes or is written: 
Where would I go, if  I could go, who would I be, if  I could be, what would I say if  I 
had a voice, who says this, saying it’s me? Answer simply, someone answer simply. It’s 
the same old stranger as ever, for whom alone accusative I exist, in the pit of my inex-
istence, of his, of ours, there’s a simple answer [. . .] I’m not in his head, nowhere in his 
old body, and yet I’m there, for him I’m there, with him, hence all the confusion. That 
should have been enough for him, to have found me absent, but it’s not, he wants me 
there, with a form and a world, like him, in spite of him, me who am everything, like 
him who is nothing. And when he feels me void of existence it’s of his he would have 
me void, and vice versa, mad, mad, he’s mad.49
All of Beckett’s fiction plays out the consequences of turning inward when the world 
refuses to listen and, though the idea of Beckett as a Cartesian parodist is less 
 prominent in recent criticism, there is no doubt that Beckett appears intentionally to 
displace the Cartesian metaphor of knowledge as seeing and seeing in, of transpar-
ency and clear and distinct ideas, with one of listening and listening in to a deeper 
48 Toulmin (1979), 5, 7.
49 Beckett (1967), 91–2. 
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unknowing.50 Talking—either inside the head or outwith—is never regarded as a cure 
by Beckett or his characters. Writing is here a necessary but barely remedial act in the 
face of the enormity of the world’s suffering. 
DOING STRESS IN DIFFERENT VOICES: 
THE NOVEL AND THE TALKING CURE
Not all novelists have responded quite so bleakly to the idea of a ‘talking cure’: the 
idea that emerged in the English speaking world after Freud’s successful American 
visit of 1909. In this section, I will briefly examine two writers—Wells and Woolf—
whose work, in responding to the first stirrings of ‘therapy culture’, offers insights into 
the therapeutic possibilities of the novel at the dawn of the new and complex ‘risk’ 
society that began in the early 20th century. In the opening chapter of H.G. Wells’s 
The Secret Places of the Heart (1922), Sir Richmond Hardy, suffering from what 
would now most likely be diagnosed as minor depression or ‘stress’, consults his 
Harley Street physician, Dr Martineau, in search of a ‘pick-me-up, a stimulating 
harmless drug of some sort’. He is looking, he says, for something that will ‘pull me 
together’, get him ‘up to scratch’ again: ‘I’ve lost my unity. I’m not a man but a mob. 
I’ve got to recover my vigour. At any cost.’51 The good doctor, however, declining the 
request for a ‘tonic’, diagnoses a disorder of thinking; his patient is living too much in 
his head, he advises, ‘the current of your thoughts fermenting’, no longer able to reach 
beyond the skull and infer the direction of the world. Martineau’s recommendation is 
homeopathic: ‘why go out of the mental sphere for a treatment? Talk and thought; 
these are your remedies.’52 But he also reassures Hardy that his is not a singular aber-
ration; his maladaptive ruminations are manifestations of a collective condition 
infecting his entire generation. Before 1910, he insists, the experience of the world was 
of a ‘sheltering and friendly greenhouse in which we grew. We fitted our minds to that 
. . . And here we are with the greenhouse falling in upon us lump by lump, smash and 
clatter, the wild winds of heaven tearing in through the gaps.’53 
In this new world, malaise is the norm, morbidity generalised, disaster felt to be 
imminent: ‘this sense of a coming smash is epidemic . . . It’s at the back of all sorts of 
mental trouble. It’s a new state of mind. Before the war it was abnormal—a phase of 
neurasthenia. Now it is almost the natural state . . . a loss of confidence in the general 
background of life. So that we seem to float above abysses . . . A new, raw and dreadful 
50 For an excellent recent discussion of this aspect of Beckett’s work, see Salisbury (2012).
51 Wells (1922), 8.
52 Ibid., 6. 
53 Ibid., 10.
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sense of responsibility for the universe. Accompanied by a realization that the job is 
overwhelmingly too big for us.’54 In 1922, such professional discussions of shock, 
stress and trauma were extended beyond the Harley Street consulting room to enter 
parliament, with the presentation of the Report of the War Office Committee of 
Enquiry into ‘Shell-shock’, given significant press coverage in the Autumn of that 
year.55 Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925), though not published until three years 
later is set in 1923, a few months after the report. The character of the war veteran 
Septimus Smith is evoked through the inner voices of his thought in contrapuntal and 
distributed entanglement with the voices of a war damaged London society struggling 
to recover its equilibrium. Like Joyce’s Ulysses, this is a novel that axiomatically fore-
grounds the centrality and therapeutic value of voice in fiction whilst it offers the first 
extended analysis of the aetiology of trauma, personal and public, in its theme. Four 
years after Armistice, Septimus haunts the edges of the metropolis whose familiar 
sounds, the ‘swing, tramp and trudge . . . the bellow and the uproar . . . the triumph 
and the jingle, once so exhilarating, are now a dissonant “clanging”, and whose 
 customary rhythms, “the leaden circles” dissolving into air’, have turned stochastic.56 
Like Defoe’s Crusoe, or Coleridge’s mariner or Conrad’s Marlow, Septimus is another 
revenant, called forth to tell his tale: ‘“To whom?” he asked out loud. To the Prime 
Minister, the voices which rustled above his head replied . . . painfully drawing out 
these profound truths which needed, so deep were they, so difficult, an immense effort 
to speak out.’57 Like Wells’s wise doctor, Septimus too intuits that the path to recovery 
might lie in ‘talk’ and ‘thought’: ‘communication is health, communication is 
 happiness’, he thinks.58 But as he talks with his voices, others overhear, but rarely 
 listen; wife and doctors alike dismiss his ‘message’.
The report on shell-shock, published four years after Armistice, might be regarded 
as the first official license for the ‘talking cure’. For it was the first official recognition 
that recursivity, self-interpretation, self-talk, is as much part of the complex aetiology 
of trauma as the simple causality of a physiological response to discrete physical or 
mental shocks. Trauma eludes simple causal explanation and requires the grasp of 
dynamic complexity or emergence; for its devastation lies in the seismic ripples of 
aftershock that serve retrospectively to amplify and multiply the effects of the original 
shock which may then settle into a circle of intensified interpretation that takes on 
characteristics of the delusional. Even relatively small disturbances may begin a 
54 Ibid., 6–7.
55 See Jackson (2013). Mark Jackson points out the fact that Wells’s novel is published the year of the 
report on shell-shock. Shephard (2014) has a very thorough discussion of the report and its impact. 
56 Woolf (1925), 4, 58.
57 Ibid., 57.
58 Ibid., 93.
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 process eventually running on its own internal momentum that leads to shattering of 
the self. Trauma theorists such as Kathy Karuth and Judith Herman, drawing on the 
pioneering work on dissociation of the psychiatrist Bessel van der Kolk, have argued 
that for the trauma victim, the repetition-compulsion so evident in the persistence of 
Septimus’s voices in calling him back to the scene of war, arises not simply out of the 
shock of the threat of death, but more as a response to the missing of the experience, 
the sense that the trauma response of numbing has not allowed the victim to know 
and therefore know how to incorporate the event into a meaningful narrative.59 The 
defence of dissociation, or numbing, like the terrified crouching animal caught in the 
headlight, protects against annihilation by the overwhelming force of the original 
offence. What has been blanked, however, comes back to haunt, uncontrolled, like the 
‘tip of the tongue’ experience, where absence is felt as presence. Woolf is the first to 
experiment with fictional multi-focalisation, formal and recursive patterning and 
 repetition, networks of echolalic sound and metaphor, in order to immerse her read-
ers in a formal enactment of traumatic experience as a complex and emergent process. 
Furthermore, she achieves much of this through experimentation with voice. All the 
organising tropes of the novel are auditory: shouts, rustlings, reverberations, echoes, 
amplification, leaden circles dissolving into air. Woolf reminds us that sound—unlike 
sight which can preserve detachment, the capacity to shut down at will—infiltrates the 
body, just as the voices of memory blur past and present. Septimus loses all sense of 
the matter that is him and that is other. 
For Woolf’s novel too shows how anomalous beliefs take on the force of incorri-
gible truths as they are employed to salvage some meaning, model new patterns of 
coherence, for a world whose faiths have shattered; she uses metaphors of reading and 
writing—the sky-writing plane, Septimus’s ‘message’, his inability to ‘read’ the world—
and engages her readers too in reflection on their own hermeneutic activity, the pro-
cess of hypothesis, revision, inference and tropic formulation whereby we assign 
meaning in reading both novels and worlds.60 For this complex process of making 
meaning, even as it flips into the mode of the delusory, reflects the workings of singu-
lar consciousnesses always infiltrated and shaped out of the internalised voices of 
custom, family and culture. This process of enculturation and individuation, defying 
capture through top down description, ‘naming’ or analytic reduction, is encountered 
59 Herman (1992); Karuth (1995). Bessel van der Kolk’s work drew substantially on the much earlier work 
of Pierre Janet on dissociation and voices, which had largely been neglected since the early 20th century 
as a consequence of the prominence given to Freudian theory. Janet’s work developed the idea of 
19th-century physiological psychology on the idea of an ‘intelligent unconscious’, the idea that parts of 
the self  split off  through trauma returned as voices in states of dissociation bearing crucial truths 
previously unacknowledged by the hearer. 
60 Recent psychological research suggests a process very like Woolf’s portrait in her novel; see, for example, 
Bentall, de Sousa, Varese, Wickham, Sitko, Haarmans & Read (2014), 1011–22. 
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in the reading of fiction as an experiential process. Never before had the processes and 
effects of what, in today’s parlance, would be diagnosed as post traumatic stress, been 
so authentically captured as an unfolding experience that also carries a self-referential 
awareness of its own complexity. Certainly, the concept of stress as a failure of 
 adaptation to or a sense of being overwhelmed by the new and accelerated forces of 
modernity was already being described in neurobiology and medicine in the early 
twenties.61 And Hans Selye’s later notion of a ‘general adaptation syndrome’ came to 
underpin the bio-medical study of stress by the mid-20th century, drawing on and 
informed by cybernetic systems theories.62 But developing the novel’s capacity to 
model complexity, Woolf intuits, as early as 1925, and well before medical recogni-
tion, the emergence of traumatic experience through a complex dynamic process that 
she is able to model by developing the formal resources of the literary novel. Reaching 
beyond the homeostatic and the bio-regulatory, Woolf recognised the way in which 
the complex internal feedback processes in the aetiology of traumatic illness are 
 interconnected with numerous social and cultural systems that amplify and intensify 
its effects. She insists to herself: ‘I want to criticise the social system, and to show it at 
work, at its most intense.’63 Medical psychiatry in the 21st century is only just  beginning 
to appreciate the emergence of traumatic illness in similarly formal and dynamic 
 complex terms. 
Though Woolf and Wells consider the relationship between global conflict, 
 economic instability and the more indefinable effects of ‘mood’ on individual well- 
being, neither presents the professionally therapeutic models of their time as appro-
priate responses to the suffering mind. Woolf famously eschewed therapy.64 She 
regarded reading and writing, however, as therapeutic; indeed, the term bibliotherapy 
first entered the English language in 1916, in an article published in Atlantic Monthly 
entitled ‘The Literary Clinic’. But Woolf is also the first writer to try to understand 
why the alchemy or magic transformation of writing might be as or more effective 
than the transferences and counter-transferences of analytic therapy. Words, she 
 suggests, germinate something in the self  that can feel as real and material as flesh 
itself, producing an uncanny sense of intimacy in the evocation of place, character 
and mood. Woolf writes fascinatingly of the thin line between fictionality and 
 delusion, thoughts that are shaped into the controlled and written expression of voice 
and those that seem to explode out of the head or race ahead of one, taking on a life 
61 Early discussions drew heavily on 19th-century work in physiology and psychology, such as Spencer 
(1855), and on early 20th-century medical debates around neurasthenia and ‘nervousness’. 
62 Selye (1946), 117–230; this work was influenced by that of Harvard physiologist Walter B. Cannon 
(1932).
63 Bell, ed. (1977–84), ii, 248.
64 See DeSalvo (1989); Trombley (1981).
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of  their own.65 She writes of the way words can seem to have magical powers: the 
‘feeling of transparency in words when they cease to be words and become so intensi-
fied that one seems to experience them; to foretell them as if  they developed what one 
is already feeling’.66 That is why the written word, more than ‘talk’ and ‘thought’, has 
the power to ‘compose’ the affective life, to soothe and order the mind and make the 
fleetingness of thought into a permanent whole. In her 1927 essay, ‘Life and the 
Novelist’, she dismisses writing that is ‘soft and shapeless with words . . . upon real 
lips’ as giving no relief  from the ‘swarm and confusion of life’. The art of writing must 
have ‘backbone’, ‘something compelling words to shape’; indeed a novel might be 
thought of as ‘Chinese coat able to stand by itself ’. She writes how, in the discovery of 
that ‘design’ which compels words into shape through writing rather than thinking 
and talking, ‘there emerges from the mist something stark, something formidable and 
enduring, the bone and substance upon which our rush of indiscriminating emotion 
was founded’.67 Bodily synecdoche evokes her magical relation to the written, words 
chiselled out of thoughts that become flesh. 
Few writers though have reflected so intensively on the complex possibilities of 
‘voice’ in fiction that might allow the conversation with oneself  that is inner speech to 
be refined into an inner dramaturgy.68 Indeed, Woolf often describes, through free 
indirect discourse or thought reporting, the effect of a character suddenly turning 
attention upon her own thought heard as inner speech: as Mrs Ramsay settles herself, 
the children retired to bed, in the first section of To the Lighthouse, for example, 
often she found herself  sitting and looking, sitting and looking, with her work in her 
hands until she became the thing she looked at—that light, for example. And it would 
lift up on it some little phrase or other which had been lying in her mind like 
that—‘Children don’t forget, children don’t forget’—which she would repeat and 
begin adding to it. It will end, it will end, she said. It will come, it will come, when 
suddenly she added, We are in the hands of the Lord. | But instantly she was annoyed 
with herself  for saying that. Who had said it? not she; she had been trapped into say-
ing something she did not mean . . . What brought her to say that . . .?’69 
65 Woolf writes frequently of racing thoughts in her diary and fictionalises the experience near the 
beginning of To the Lighthouse (1927) in the strange entanglement of Lily’s thoughts with the sudden 
sound of the detonation of Jasper’s gun, so her thoughts appear as if  a ‘black cloud of starlings’ 
emanating from her brain. 
66 Woolf (2002), 93.
67 Woolf (1958), 42, 23. 
68 Recent developments in therapeutic interventions that draw on such insights include narrative and 
avatar therapy. See White & Epston (1992) for an account by the pioneers of narrative therapy; the 
psychiatrist Julian Leff has recently pioneered avatar therapy, see Leff, Williams, Huckvale, Arbuthnot & 
Leff (2014).
69 Woolf ([1927], 1960), 102–3.
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The passage again shows how fiction can blur inner and outer: in the phrase ‘she had 
been trapped into saying something she did not mean’ and in ‘Who had said it?’, the 
text is presumably referring to Mrs Ramsay’s inner speech, the train of her thought as 
the unwanted voice of patriarchal religiosity pops up unexpectedly. Or is it that we are 
listening to Mrs Ramsay speaking out her thoughts, as in Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe? 
Though Woolf admired Defoe, her early experiments with voice and inner speech 
appear to have been most influenced by her early enthusiasm for Dostoevsky’s ability 
to capture ‘those most swift and complicated states of mind, of rethinking the whole 
train of thought in all its speed . . . to follow not only the vivid streak of achieved 
thought, but to suggest the dim and populous underworld of the mind’s conscious-
ness where desires and impulses are moving blindly beneath the sod’.70 It was also 
after reading Dostoevsky that one of the most influential modern theorists of the 
novel, Mikhail Bakhtin, developed his own theory of ‘double voicing’, where, he 
argues, the author ‘uses another voice by inserting a new semantic intentionality into 
a discourse which retains an intention of its own’.71 He suggests that what is unique 
about voice in fiction is that one or more voices occupy another creating a ‘double 
voice’; fictional writing turns into creative capital what R.D. Laing would later call the 
‘phantom concreteness’ of thought-fusion. A voice is always inhabited by the ghostly 
trace of another.72 Woolf, herself  a voice hearer, acutely aware of the proximity of 
sanity and insanity, refers to the ‘phantom’ of thought in her essay on Montaigne, but 
she knew more than most how the voice that sets up its tenancy within the voice that 
is recognised as one’s own, as Bakhtin puts it, ‘acts upon, influences, and in one way 
or another determines the author’s discourse’.73 Many writers have spoken of how 
voices seem to arrive with agency, asking to be shaped into characters, but for Woolf, 
the internal wrestle for self-possession, the battle with the voices that so often seemed 
to run away with her, relied on a capacity for fiction-making that was, undoubtedly 
and literally in her case, sometimes an act of survival. Woolf recognised just how 
much the negative capability at the heart of self-recognition, the capacity of the writer 
to become another, is both a blessing and a curse. 
70 Woolf (1986–94), 85.
71 Bakhtin (1984), 189.
72 This idea is discussed by Laing (1960). 
73 Bakhtin (1984), 195.
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A WITTGENSTEINIAN REMEDY: 
THE NOVEL AS THERAPY FOR THE THERAPY CULTURE
The novel might be considered the most effective instrument the modern world has 
evolved for exercising all aspects of the ‘social brain’, or practical reason, the skills 
required for negotiating the modern world of uncertainty and complexity. Novels 
reveal the stress of anticipating and dealing with the unexpected, the trauma of its 
arrival in forms that often only retrospectively fit a pattern. Cognitive scientists now 
believe that the brain is a Bayesian mechanism, equipped for probabilistic reasoning. 
Though located inside the head, it reaches the world through the affective and sensory 
feedback of perceptual error when the world fails to fit the schema projected onto it; 
from brain to emergent properties of mind, this process allows the modification of 
existing schema in order to produce a more effective fit as the world changes.74 The 
brain is continuously monitoring the gap between the schematic hypotheses put to the 
world and the data that the world feeds back. Novels model some aspects of the world 
beyond, in their own storyworlds—realistically, fantastically, analogically, allegori-
cally—and require readers to negotiate the complexity of the storyworld through 
their own error correction in reading, at the same time requiring that they acquire the 
appropriate schema for assessing and negotiating this particular storyworld. Here, 
negotiation of the ‘gap’ is also that between the imaginary world of the novel and the 
reader’s own historical context. Carefully read, novels educate their readers in how to 
read them by offering a workout for Bayesian skills first recognised and then devel-
oped in the 18th century, the first age of risk. But novels also offer further education 
into awareness of the shortcomings and limitations of probability thinking. The 
Bayesian brain might be understood as configured to reduce uncertainty by providing 
a default ‘safe’ system, reliant on habit and routine, the broadly predictable learnt 
from previous experience and involving the use of analogical reasoning, inference, 
extrapolation, in order, above all, to avoid surprise as evolutionary costly. But the 
Bayesian brain is a poor instrument for coping with shock, trauma and surprise, that 
is, the radically unexpected. The kinds of extreme and sudden change, associated with 
the critical transitions of ‘tipping points’, arising in complex and interconnected and 
emergent systems reveal the limitations of the Bayesian; but surprise and the 
 unexpected is the lifeblood of novels. The cascading effects of small actions, the circu-
lar and backward causalities that amplify and intensify through a complex system, are 
all familiar to novel readers; as the American novelist William Gass observes: ‘it’s the 
74 This Bayesian idea of the mind has been developed in recent theories of the ‘predictive mind’; see Clark 
(2013), 181–204; for a summary of the work on the predictive mind to date, see Hohwy (2013); for an 
account of the legacy of the work of the Reverend Thomas Bayes in the 18th century, see McGrayne 
(1911).
 The Novel as Therapy 59
daily diet—angers, fears, humiliations—Dr. Johnson’s tea, Balzac’s coffee, Freud’s 
cigars—which lead the liver to overlabor, stomach to puncture, heart to fail, the quiet 
worker to go berserk and ghetto to erupt, though it’s only the seizure, stroke, or strike 
which reaches the papers’.75 
Novels keep the Bayesian mechanism sharp through the challenges, in reading, to 
confirmation bias, faulty inference, inattentive focus; but they also reveal the limita-
tions of all models and suggest how, when prediction and knowledge systems fail, in 
an increasingly uncertain world, emotional and practical skills of resilience will have 
to compensate for the effects of unknowing. One thematic preoccupation of the novel 
has always been with the propensity of the human mind to protect itself  from the 
threat of overwhelming trauma by hiding from itself  the signs that small changes are 
building towards potentially more serious or even catastrophic proportions. Novels 
have always been fascinated by the delusional, the self-deceptive and the failure to 
read the signs of oncoming disaster for fear of the pain involved in its imagining, or 
of being overwhelmed by the trauma of recognition. That is why adultery, betrayal, 
hubris, self-performance, lies, deception, trickery, fictionality, and the propensity of 
the self  to flee from those inner voices that whisper truths we cannot bear to hear, have 
been its major themes from the 18th century to the present.
In foregrounding ways in which the self  is both interior and exterior, a singularity 
and a plurality of voices, novels might be seen to educate readers in awareness of their 
own confabulatory performances and, in particular, of the fallacious assumption that 
the ‘I’ alone has access to knowledge of itself, that we necessarily know ourselves 
 better than we can know other people, simply because we can ‘look in’ to our own 
minds and not those of others. In assuming such transparency we mostly fall into 
error. In novels, mind is distributed—not only through the plurivocality of inner 
speech that renders the mind axiomatically social—but discovered to be so through 
the development of techniques such as free indirect discourse that hugely facilitated 
both double-voicing or the recognition of the affinity between the novel as a fiction 
and the basic fiction-making activities of the human brain as it works to fill in gaps in 
knowledge with its own confabulations. In George Eliot’s Middlemarch, for example, 
Dorothea Brooke’s confabulatory attempts to disguise from herself  the actual 
mean-spirited and pedantic nature of her husband, Casaubon, and the mausoleum 
that is her marriage, is conveyed in that double voicing of authorial irony that we hear 
through her thoughts, from her first elaboration of her feelings for him: how his mind 
is ‘an embalmment of knowledge’, his scholarly pursuits are ‘an inscription in a door 
of a museum’. It is only when Dorothea can no longer avoid her feelings, which she 
refuses to feel, but which colour the entire feeling-tone of her Umwelt, her experienced 
75 Gass (1983), 60.
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world, after the trip to Rome and the return to the marriage home with its darkening 
interiors and atmosphere of creeping claustrophobia, that she at last recognises and 
can face her dreadful mistake. She comes to her senses, in finally opening up to  ‘feeling, 
an idea wrought back to the direction of sense, like the solidity of objects’. What 
could be a more powerful extension of the Bayesian than that?76 
The mind’s propensity for manufacturing pragmatic fictions and confabulatory 
hypotheses in the absence of certain evidence is also its capacity for inventive and 
abductive thinking, conjuring the possible when the probable seems unavailable 
through lack of evidence. The thematic preoccupation of the novel with its own 
 condition of fictionality is therefore hardly surprising. The novel became established 
as a genre and disseminated itself  with incredible speed from the middle of the 18th 
century once it discovered and explored the nature of fictionality: the novel may even 
be deemed to have invented the concept of fictionality, recognising, in an age of 
 systems, the pragmatic truth that fictions are provisional tools for finding things out 
rather than mimetic representations of what they purport to describe.77 As Catherine 
Gallagher has recently argued, ‘from the outset, novelistic fictionality has been unique 
and paradoxical. The novel is not just one kind of fictional narrative among others; it 
is the kind in which and through which fictionality became manifest, explicit, widely 
understood, and accepted. The historical connection between the terms novel and 
fiction is intimate; they were mutually constitutive.’78 Yet even as it flaunts its fiction-
ality, the novel also hides it by ‘locking it inside the confines of the credible’ for, if  the 
novel is really to function as a means to expose the limitations of models and systems 
and to reveal how the human mind is lured into taking them for real and thereby 
 making the world safe, closed down, convenient, the novel has to show how such 
 models function to persuade us through their air and operational coding of probabil-
ity. The moral anxiety about ‘feigning’ reality disappeared in the mid 18th century, but 
the fascination with laying bare the formal and conventional scaffolding of the story-
world has persisted; it seems to have most flourished during historical periods of 
intensified doubt and uncertainty, such as our own, when the available schema for 
modelling the world seem increasingly inadequate. Novels carry the Gödelian insight 
that all systems are incomplete, for no system can offer a complete account of itself  
within its own terms. The aporetic uncertainty of any system lies in its inability to get 
outside in order to describe itself, so that novels may have valuable things to tell us 
about the limits of models as systems for knowing in their careful observation of the 
vehicular terms of the model, their own languages and technical conventions. 
One of the most compelling accounts of the novel in these terms has been put 
76 Eliot (2004), 193.
77 The classic work on this is Vaihinger (1911).
78 Gallagher (2006), i. 337.
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forward, perhaps not surprisingly, by a novelist. Orhan Pamuk’s The Naive and the 
Sentimental Novelist (2010), borrows from Friedrich Schiller’s conceptualisation of 
two fundamental modes of the poetic that Pamuk sees at the heart of the novel: the 
naive, which involves a transparent view of language as expressive, mimetic or 
 referential, that seems to bring into view a pre-existing world; and what he calls the 
‘sentimental’, where language points to itself  as representation and therefore artifice, 
rendering problematic its relation to whatever is taken to be the real outside of the 
medium of language. Again what is strikingly apparent in this account is that the 
 fundamentally recursive nature of the sentimental, so defined, reinforces the sense 
that recursivity, viewed by evolutionary anthropologists as the definitive skill of the 
human mind, is presented here not so much as the activity of ‘time-travelling’ and 
metarepresentation, as discussed earlier, but as the fundamental property without 
which there could be no human language at all. The branching and recursive structure 
of language, its implicit self-reference, is echoed in fiction’s fascination with paradoxes 
of self-referentiality as metareference—its preoccupation with pointing to its own 
impossible existence as simultaneously word and world. For the philosophical  logician, 
the paradox of linguistic self-reference is a bothersome obstacle in the search for 
watertight logical categories, free of interference from the sign systems that mediate 
them. The logician’s favourite example is the self-referential assertion that undoes the 
clear separation of categories, the sentence that points to itself, such as: ‘This is not a 
sentence’ or the Liar Paradox, ‘All Cretans are Liars, said the Cretan’. In order to 
disambiguate such sentences one has to move beyond the sentence itself  to a metalevel 
that posits a context or speaker or a further source-monitoring tag that offers 
 resolution by presenting the sentence as existing in a novel, for example. 
The paradox has fascinated rather than bothered novelists, and for almost  opposite 
reasons, pointing to the way that language in fiction reveals a world that is entirely 
modelled in language and, in that sense, points only to itself  and yet can seem more 
compelling and ‘true’ than any fully propositional sentence that is a description of the 
world. Schlegel’s understanding of the paradox gave rise to his concept of Romantic 
Irony but only after his reading of Cervantes’ Don Quixote, where the delusory exploits 
of the would-be knight are further complicated by Cervantes’ exuberant play with 
recursivity in the second volume. Here he presents Quixote reading the complete 
 narrative account of his own exploits in a cheap printed book that appears impossibly 
adjacent in time to the events that we have just read in the story. In Pamuk’s view, the 
novel transports us into a storyworld, but disciplines our immersion in requiring that 
we reflect on the way in which we think through and therefore pay attention to the 
medium. This is the basis for his key argument that the novel is the definitive anti- 
Cartesian genre, for ‘the art of the novel relies on our ability to believe simultaneously 
in contradictory states . . . and cultivating the habit of reading novels, indicates a 
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desire to escape the logic of the single-centred Cartesian world where mind and body, 
logic and imagination are placed in opposition’. The more effective the novelist is in 
holding in tension the naive, conceived as the empathetic and child-like, with the 
 sentimental, conceived as the technical and self-referential, the greater and more 
affecting the novel: ‘the art of the novel is being able to speak about ourselves as if  we 
were another person, and about others as if  we were in their shoes. And just as there 
is a limit to the extent we can speak about our self  as if  we were another person, there 
is also a limit to how much we can identify with another person.’79 
The novel’s great theme and discovery is that our commonest delusion is to believe 
that we have a privileged insight into our own minds; to read novels is to discover that 
we use the same inferential skills in reading ourselves, setting up one voice against 
another in our inner speech, as when we try to work out what others are thinking, 
desiring and believing. What seems most transparent may often emerge as most 
opaque. We listen in to our own inner speech but that is already constituted out of our 
mentalising of other minds. If  we accept the anthropological argument that the mind 
evolved first to be social, to read other minds for threat, possibility, cooperative or 
competitive strategy, then it seems likely, even from this very long perspective, that the 
mind reads itself  as a kind of ‘other’ and is no more transparent to itself, and may 
even be more opaque to itself, than the minds of others.80 In the novel, we read our-
selves through the rendition and completion of the minds of others; we learn to read 
our own minds, therefore, against the grain of the solipsistic. That is a kind of therapy. 
Moreover, as a complex model that models the limits of its own complexity, the novel 
mostly proceeds not simply from unknowing to knowing (the usual reading of 
Bildung), but by the disconfirmation of untested and assumed hypotheses that reveal 
the world as ever extended and complicated by the models we use to model it; a 
world—as in Beck’s presentation of risk—that will ever exceed our systems of know-
ing. This knowledge, that renders the world both less and more knowable than we 
might have assumed, challenges the cognitive bias involved in trying to make the world 
conform to our models of it. That means trying to read the world against the grain of 
the egotistical and the narcissistic. That is also therapeutic. 
The major theme of Wittgenstein’s later writing was the call for philosophy to 
provide a therapy for the deleterious effects created in adopting a broadly Cartesian 
outlook that foregrounds self-transparency as the key to and goal of knowledge. The 
ramifications of this assumption in our lives create what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘the 
mental cramps’ that make us sick.81 The problem, as he sees it, is that the very medium 
79 Pamuk (2010), 33, 71.
80 See Tomasello (2014).
81 Wittgenstein (1998); on the emergence of Wittgenstein’s thinking about philosophy of therapy, see 
Fisher (2011) and Pateman (1992).
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of language that we use to represent thought leads us into error, but such error is so 
deeply entangled in thinking at the level of metaphor and structural analogy, that we 
fail to notice its effects. Our language is awash with metaphors of visual perception as 
the vehicle for thinking about knowing and self-knowledge; until we begin to chal-
lenge and change the metaphors, even as we reject Cartesianism, we shall find our-
selves still in its grip as the various entailments of the metaphor continue to preserve 
inferential relations. In other words, Wittgenstein shows how non-intentional analog-
ical reasoning may hold us in its grip and shape and pre-structure beliefs without our 
realisation.82 So for Wittgenstein, therapy needs to happen at the level of language, 
through a process that leads us to become aware of the medium if  we are to be cured 
of our erroneous expectations and the damage they create, but also to acknowledge 
the power of the medium to set up a world. We need a cure for the metaphors of 
self-transparency, the idea that we must look within and know ourselves before we can 
reliably look out; for mostly unknowingly, we use language to make what is abstract 
and conceptual and ultimately unknowable, into something that seems concrete and 
self-evidently before our ‘eyes’: ‘I can see it now’, ‘yes, I see’, ‘I’m in the dark’, ‘it’s 
getting clearer to me’; we have our eyes opened, or see something in the right light; at 
other times, often when we are trying to remember, we think of our minds as filing 
cabinets or cupboards where we ‘retrieve’ our memories as though we are looking in a 
cupboard and rummaging for old clothes. 
Our thoughts become things that we see or touch, bats hanging in the dark as 
Woolf expressed it. For with her interest in and foregrounding of voice, Woolf often 
portrays thinking humorously, thoughts looming out of  primeval darkness, like bats 
hanging in a cave or tumbling around like ‘old clothes in my dirty clothes basket’. In 
an essay entitled ‘Pictures’, she fantastically imagines the ‘mind’s eye’ turned inward 
like an amoebic life within, a great ‘nerve which hears and smells, which transmits 
heat and cold, which is attached to the brain and rouses the mind’.83 The grotesque 
concreteness of  Woolf ’s metaphors for thinking point to their own reductio effect. 
Woolf  is puncturing her own and our yearning for transparency: for she recognises 
the power of  the metaphor in sustaining a belief  in self-transparency, the idea that 
we can peer into the mind like a potholer with a torch; she knew, though, that her own 
mind remained a mystery to her except in its externalisation and revelation through 
the voices of  fiction, her fictional shaping and befriending of  the voices in her head. 
Woolf  and Wittgenstein were barely acquainted, but they might have learned 
82 This might be seen as a factor in the perpetuation but reversal of Cartesian thinking engaged in Ian 
Hacking’s argument that in an age of materialist reductionism and assumptions that the mind is reducible 
to the brain, we are living in an era of reverse or neo-Cartesianism, where the mind is seen as driven by 
the body rather than vice versa: see Hacking (2007), 78–105.
83 Woolf (1986–94) iv. 244, 519.
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 valuable things from each other. Wittgenstein sought a new therapy from within 
 philosophy to correct several hundred years of error; he desired a philosophical 
 ‘therapy’ for all those therapies that advocate the idea of looking in and finding  oneself  
as the beginnings of the therapeutic. Wittgenstein read few novels, or he might have 
found what he was searching for in their orientation to voice, decentring, complexity, 
fictionality and recursivity, but most of all in their awareness of language, of a 
medium, in shaping and building worlds. For me, that is the most overlooked yet in 
some ways most important contribution that the novel offers to and as therapy: a 
therapy for all those times and places where therapy has failed to monitor the effects 
of its own medium, models and metaphors.84 
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